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Abstract
The sure thing principle and the law of total probability are basic laws in
classic probability theory. A disjunction fallacy leads to the violation of these
two classical probability laws. In this paper, a new quantum dynamic belief
decision making model based on quantum dynamic modelling and Dempster-
Shafer (D-S) evidence theory is proposed to address this issue and model the
real human decision-making process. Some mathematical techniques are bor-
rowed from quantum mathematics. Generally, belief and action are two parts
in a decision making process. The uncertainty in belief part is represented
by a superposition of certain states. The uncertainty in actions is repre-
sented as an extra uncertainty state. The interference effect is produced due
to the entanglement between beliefs and actions. Basic probability assign-
ment (BPA) of decisions is generated by quantum dynamic modelling. Then
BPA of the extra uncertain state and an entanglement degree defined by an
entropy function named Deng entropy are used to measure the interference
effect. Compared the existing model, the number of free parameters is less
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in our model. Finally, a classical categorization decision-making experiment
is illustrated to show the effectiveness of our model.
Keywords: Quantum dynamic model; Dempster-Shafer evidence theory;
the sure thing principle; disjunction fallacy; interference effect;
categorization decision-making experiment; Deng entropy
1. Introduction
The sure thing principle introduced by Jim Savage[1] is a fundamental prin-
ciple in economics and probability theory. It means that if one prefers action
A over B under state of the world X , while action A is also preferred under
the opposite state of world ¬X , then it can be concluded that one will still
prefer action A over B under the state of the world is unspecified. The law of
total probability is a fundamental rule relating marginal probabilities to con-
ditional probabilities. It expresses the total probability of an outcome which
can be realized via several distinct events. However, many experiments and
studies have shown that the sure thing principle and the law of total proba-
bility can be violated due to the disjunction effect. The disjunction fallacy is
an empirical finding in which the proportion taking the target gamble under
the unknown condition falls below both of the proportions taking the target
gamble under each of the known conditions. The same person takes the tar-
get gamble under both known conditions, but then rejects the target gamble
under the unknown condition[2].
Generally, the sure thing principle and the law of total probability are ba-
sic probability laws. However, the disjunction fallacy leads to the violation
of them. To explain it, many studies have been proposed. The original
explanation was a psychological idea based on the failure of consequential
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reasoning under unknown condition[3]. More recently, to explain these para-
doxical findings, the theory of quantum probability has been introduced in
the quantum cognition and decision making process. Quantum information
has a wide application, like in user security[4], quantum communication[5]
and so on. Quantum probability is an effective approach to psychology[6–9].
It has been widely applied to psychology and decision making fields by ex-
plaining order effect[10–12], disjunction effect[13], the interference effect of
categorization[14], prisoner’s dilemma[15], conceptual combinations[16, 17],
quantum game theory[18–20] and so on. To explain the disjunction fallacy
which leads to the violation of the sure thing principle and the law of total
probability, many models have been proposed, such as a quantum dynamical
model[21, 22], quantum prospect decision theory[23–26] and quantum-like
Bayesian networks[27] etc. Besides quantum-like approach toolbox was also
proposed[28–30].
In this paper, a new quantum dynamic belief decision making model based
on quantum dynamic modelling and D-S evidence theory is proposed to ex-
plain the disjunction fallacy. Dempster-Shafer evidence theory was proposed
by Dempster in 1967[31] and modified by Shafer in 1978[32]. Evidential
reasoning is an approach handing the evidence is D-S theory[33, 34]. And
Deng entropy[35] is an efficient tool to measure the information volume of
evidence[36, 37]. Many applications in realistic projects have shown the
power of D-S evidence theory handling uncertain information[38–41]. Be-
sides, it has been applied in quantum information and quantum probability
in many works[42–45]. In our model, D-S theory is used to extend the action
state space and uncertainty during the decision-making process is the crucial
factor of measuring the interference effect.
Consider the prisoner dilemma (PD) paradigm[3], two players need to de-
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cide independently whether to cooperate with opponent or to defect against
opponent. Beliefs and actions are two parts in a decision-making process.
The real situation in action part is that some participants can not make a
precise choice to cooperate or to defect for sure, but they are forced to make
a final decision in the experiment. In our model, the uncertainty in action
is represented in a specific uncertain state and the uncertainty in belief is
represented by a superposition of certain states. As the beliefs and actions
are entangled in some degree, the interference effect can be produced. Unlike
the previous models, the interference effect is measured by the distribution
of the uncertain state in action. The quantum dynamic model is applied to
generate the basic probability assignment (BPA), which measures the sup-
porting of a decision. Then the uncertain information will be distributed by
using Deng entropy. A classical categorization decision-making experiment
is illustrated in this paper to show the effectiveness of our model. Though
an extra uncertain state is introduced, the new model is more succinct as the
free parameters decrease compared with classical quantum dynamic models.
Because the entanglement degree is calculated by an entropy function rather
being set as a free parameter.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the preliminaries
of basic theories employed are briefly introduced. The new quantum dynamic
belief decision making model is proposed in Section 3. Then a categorization
decision-making experiment is illustrated and our new model is applied to it
in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 comes to the conclusion.
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2. Preliminaries
2.1. Quantum dynamic model
The quantum dynamic model model first proposed by Busemeyer etal. in
2006[46] is formulated as a random walk decision process. The evolution of
complex valued probability amplitudes over time is described. The interfer-
ence effect can be generated in a quantum model which is not possible in a
classical Markov model. The quantum dynamic model assumes that a par-
ticipant has some potential to be in every state in the beginning. Thus the
person’s state is a superposition of all possible n states
|ψ〉 = ψ1 |S1〉+ ψ2 |S2〉+ . . . ψn |Sn〉
and the initial state corresponds to an amplitude distribution ψ (0) repre-
sented by the n× 1 matrix.
ψ (0)=


ψ1
ψ2
...
ψn

 .
During the decision making process, the state will evolve across time obeying
a Schro¨dinger equation.
d
dt
ψ (t) = −i ·H · ψ (t) (1)
where H is a Hamiltonian matrix: H† = H , H has elements hij in row i
column j representing the instantaneous rate of change to |i〉 from |j〉. Eq.
(1) has a matrix exponential solution:
ψ (t2) = e
−iHt · ψ (t1) =U · ψ (t1) (2)
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where matrix U = e−iHt is a unitary matrix: U †U = I. It finally guarantees
that ψ (t) always has unit length.
For t = t2 − t1, the transition probabilities Tij of observing state i at time t2
given that state j was observed at time t1 is determined as
Tij (t) = |Uij (t)|2 (3)
where Uij is the line i, column j element of the unitary matrix U .
Based on the above definition, the amplitude distribution of person’s state
evolves to ψ (t) from the initial ψ (0) across time t as Eq. (4), which shows
the dynamic in a decision making process.
ψ (t) = U · ψ (0) (4)
2.2. Dempster-Shafer evidence theory
Let F denote a finite set composed of all possible values of the random
variable X . The elements of set F are mutually exclusive. F is called the
frame of discernment. Let 2F denote the power set of F whose each element
corresponds to a subset of values of X . Basic probability assignment (BPA)
is a mapping from 2F to [0, 1], defined as[31, 32]:
m : 2F → [0, 1] (5)
satisfying ∑
A∈2F
m (A) = 1 (6)
and
m (∅) = 0 (7)
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The mass function m represents supporting degree to proposition A. A mass
function corresponds to a belief (Bel) function and a plausibility(P l) function
respectively.
Given m : 2U → [0, 1], Bel (A) function represents the whole belief degree to
the proposition A, defined as
Bel (A) =
∑
B⊆A
m (B) ∀A ⊆ 2F (8)
P l function represents the belief degree of not denying proposition A, defined
as
P l (A) = 1−Bel (A¯) = ∑
B∩A 6=∅
m (B) ∀A ⊆ 2F (9)
where A¯ = 2F − A.
As P l (A) ≥ Bel (A), P l function and Bel function are upper and lower limit
of the supporting of A.
In the following, an game of picking ball will be used to show the D-S theory’s
ability of handling uncertainty. There are two boxes filled with some balls
as shown in Fig. 1. Left box is contended with red balls and right box is
contended with blue balls. The number of balls in each box is unknown.
Now, a ball is picked randomly from two boxes. The probability of picking
from left box P1 is known as 0.4 while picking from right box P2 is known
as 0.6. It is easy to obtain that the probability of picking a red ball is 0.4
while picking a blue ball is 0.6 based on probability theory.
Now, the situation changes as shown in Fig. 2. The left box is contended
with right balls while the right box is contended with red and blue balls. The
exact number of the balls in each box is still unknown and the ratio of red
balls with blue balls is completely unknown. The probabilities of selecting
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Figure 1: A game of picking ball which can be handled by probability theory
from two boxes keep the same, P1 = 0.4 and P2 = 0.6. The question is what
the probability that a red ball is picked is. Due to the lack of information, the
question can not be addressed in probability theory. However, D-S evidence
theory can effectively handle it. We can obtain a BPA that m (R) = 0.4 and
m (R,B) = 0.6. Then the uncertainty is well expressed in the frame of D-S
theory.
2.3. Pignistic probability transformation
The term ”pignistic” proposed by Smets[47] is originated from the word
pignus, meaning bet in Latin. Pignistic probability transformation (PPT)
has a wide application in decision making. Let m be a BPA on a frame of
discernment F , then the PPT function is defined as
Bet (A) =
∑
A⊆B
m (B)
|B| (10)
where |B| denotes the number of elements in set B. This is called as the
cardinality of B.
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Figure 2: A game of picking ball where probability theory is unable but D-S evidence
theory is able to handle
2.4. Deng entropy
In order to measure the information volume of a BPA, Deng entropy has
been proposed[35], which is defined as follows
Ed = −
∑
i
m (Xi) log2
m (Xi)
2|Xi| − 1 (11)
where Xi is a proposition in BPA m and |Xi| is the cardinality of Xi repre-
senting the number of elements in it. For example, for BPA m1 : m1 (a) =
m1 (b) = m1 (ab) =
1
3
, where proposition ab means that both proposition a
and b are possible, namely it is uncertain whether belongs to a or b.
Ed (m1) = −1
3
× log2 1/321−1 −
1
3
× log2 1/321−1 −
1
3
× log2 1/322−1 = 2.11
For BPA m2 : m2 (a) = m2 (b) =
1
2
Ed (m2) = −1
2
× log2 1/221−1 −
1
2
× log2 1/221−1 = 1
Specially, when the BPA is consisted of singleton sets as m2, namely |Xi|
of all the proposition in BPA is 1. Deng entropy degenerates to Shannon
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entropy.
Ed = −
∑
i
m (Xi) log2
m (Xi)
21 − 1 = −
∑
i
m (Xi) log2m (Xi) (12)
2.5. Quantum entanglement in D-S evidence theory
In this part, the correlation between Deng entropy and entanglement is dis-
cussed.
Let us consider an example as follows. Suppose 32 students participated a
course examination and one of them won the first place. In order to know
who is the first one, we go to ask their course teacher. But the teacher does
not want to directly tell us. Instead, she just answers Yes or No to our
questions. The problem is how many times do we need ask at most in order
to know who is the first one? Assume the times is t, it is easy to answer the
problem through calculating the information volume by using information
entropy
t = log232 = 5
Now, lets consider another situation. Assume we have been told that there
are students tied for first. In this case, how many times do we need ask at
most to know who are the first ones? In this case, obviously
t ≥ log232
According to Deng entropy, the information volume is as follows
Ed = − 1232−1 × log2
( 1
232−1
21−1
)
− 1
232−1
× log2
( 1
232−1
22−1
)
− · · · − 1
232−1
× log2
( 1
232−1
232−1
)
≈ 48
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In Deng and Deng (2014)[48], the conclusion is that we need 32 times to de-
termine the top 1 student(s). However, it is not correct since that, according
to the result above, we need 48 times to obtain the result. Deng and Deng
proposed that entanglement is the key to cause the difference of these two
values. Because the entanglement brings a larger information volume and
the extra information is measured by Deng entropy.
3. Proposed method
The quantum dynamic belief decision making model based on quantum dy-
namic modelling and D-S evidence theory can model the decision making
process. Beliefs and actions are two main parts in a decision making process.
The uncertainty of beliefs is represented by a superposition of certain states
which collapses when the beliefs become certain. When the beliefs are un-
certain, the interference effect is produced due to the entanglement between
beliefs and actions. The concept of interference effect in quantum cognition
is that the states can interference with each other, which leads to the viola-
tion of the law of total probability. The uncertainty of actions is expressed as
an extra uncertain state with D-S theory. It is rational to assume that some
people hesitate to make a precise action decision during a decision making
process. However, a final action decision has to be made as an uncertain ac-
tion is not an outcome. In classical theory, uncertain information in actions
can be distributed into basic probabilities using PPT[47]. However, in some
cases the beliefs and actions are entangled in some degree, which means that
beliefs and actions need to be coordinated. It has been verified that partici-
pants feel the need to coordinate beliefs and actions.[49, 50]. In a entangled
system, uncertainty in actions should be handled differently to measure the
interference effect. To address it, an entanglement degree is defined in our
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model using Deng entropy. The flow chart of our model is shown in Fig. 3.
Figure 3: The flow chart of proposed model
In the following, an example of PD paradigm is used to illustrate the pro-
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posed model. In a PD game, participants need to decide whether to cooper-
ate (C) or to defect (D) against the opponent independently. In the study,
participants are requested to make a decision under the condition that the
opponent’s decision is known and that the opponent’s decision is totally un-
known. The result is that the probability of defecting under known condition
is larger than the one under unknown condition, which violates the law of
total probability. Based on the flow chart, the proposed model can be listed
step by step as follows:
Step 1: Determine the frame of discrimination
When the opponent’s decision is known to defect (D) or to cooperate (C),
the outcome of the game will be either to defect (D) or to cooperate (C).
Thus the basic states ”DD”, ”CD”, ”DC” and ”DD” consist the frame of
discrimination, where, for example, ”CD” represents the participant decide to
cooperate knowing the opponent defects. Then extra state ”CDD”, ”CDC”
and ∅ will be included to fill the power set of this discrimination. State
”CDD” represents that the participant is uncertain to cooperate or defect
when knowing the opponent defects and it can be denoted as ”UD”. Same as
it, state ”CDC” can be denoted as ”UC”. And the empty set ∅ is irrespective
in the model as it is meaningless.
When the opponent’s decision is totally unknown, the outcome of the game
will be either to defect (D) or to cooperate (C). Thus the basic states ”DU”
and ”CU” consist the frame of discrimination, where, for example, ”DU”
represents the participant decide to defect unknowing the opponent’s deci-
sion. Then extra state ”CDU” and ∅ will be included to fill the power set of
this discrimination. State ”CDU” presents that the participant is uncertain
to cooperate or defect when unknowing the opponent’s decision and it can
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be denoted as ”UU”. And the empty set ∅ is irrespective in the model as it
is meaningless.
Step 2: Representation of beliefs and actions
As the states have been extended in Step 1, the initial state involves six
combination of beliefs and actions
{|BDAD〉 , |BDAU〉 , |BDAC〉 , |BCAD〉 , |BCAU〉 , |BCAC〉}
where, for example, |BCAD〉 symbolizes the event in which the player believes
the opponent will cooperate but the player intends to act by defecting. The
model assumes that at the beginning of a game, the person has some potential
to be in every circle in Fig. 4 which illustrates the possible transitions among
the six states. So the person’s state is a superposition of the six basis states
|ψ〉 = ψDD · |BDAD〉+ ψUD · |BDAU〉+ ψCD · |BDAC〉+ ψDC · |BCAD〉
+ ψUC · |BCAU〉+ ψCC · |BCAC〉
(13)
and the initial state corresponds to an amplitude distribution represented
by the 6× 1 column matrix
ψ (0)=


ψDD
ψUD
ψCD
ψDC
ψUC
ψCC


.
where, for example, |ψDC |2 is the probability of observing state |BCAD〉 ini-
tially. The squared length of φ must equal one: ψ† · ψ = 1.
Step 3: Inferences based on prior information
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Figure 4: Transition diagram in the PD game
During the decision process, new information at time t1 changes the initial
state ar time t = 0 into a new state at time t1. For example, if the opponent
is known to defect, the amplitude distribution across states changes to
ψ (t1) =
1√
|ψDD|2 + |ψUD|2 + |ψCD|2


ψDD
ψUD
ψCD
0
0
0


=
[
ψD
0
]
. (14)
where |ψDD|2 + |ψUD|2 + |ψCD|2 equals the initial probability that the oppo-
nent defects (before given any information).
However, if the opponent’s information is totally unknown, the amplitude
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distribution will remain the same as the initial t = 0.
ψ (t1) = ψ (0) =


√
|ψDD|2 + |ψUD|2 + |ψCD|2 · ψD√
|ψDC |2 + |ψUC |2 + |ψCC |2 · ψC


=
√
|ψDD|2 + |ψUD|2 + |ψCD|2 ·
[
ψD
0
]
+
√
|ψDC |2 + |ψUC |2 + |ψCC |2 ·
[
0
ψC
]
The equation shows that the initial state is a superposition formed by a
weighted sum of the amplitude distribution for the two known conditions.
Step 4: Obtain BPA based on payoffs
During the decision making process, the participants need to evaluate the
payoffs in order to select an appropriate action, which evolve the state at
time t1 into a new state at time t2. The evolution of the state during this
time period corresponds the thought process leading to a action decision,
defection, uncertainty or cooperation. Based on the preliminaries, an unitary
matrix U = e−iHt is defined to satisfy the solution of Schro¨dinger equation.
ψ (t2) = e
−iHt · ψ (t1)
ψ (t2) is the amplitude distribution across states after evolution based on
payoffs.
H =
[
HD 0
0 HC
]
(15)
with
HD =


hD 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 −hD

 (16)
and
HC =


hC 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 −hC

 (17)
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The 3× 3 Hamiltonian matrix HD applies when the participant believes the
opponent will defect, and the other 3 × 3 Hamiltonian matrix HC applies
when the participant believes the opponent will cooperate. The parameter
hD is a function of the difference between the reward for defecting relative
to cooperating given the opponent will defect, and hC is a function of the
difference between the reward for defecting relative to cooperating given the
opponent will cooperate. The Hamiltonian matrix H transforms the state
probabilities to favor defection, cooperation or uncertainty, depending on the
reward function.
Each decision corresponds to a measurement of the state at time t2. To
obtain the BPA of certain decision, we can use an according measurement
matrix M to pick out the state. As the state ψ is a 6×1 column matrix, the
measurement matrix is defined as a 6× 6 one.
M =
(
MD 0
0 MC
)
, (18)
where all the elements is in the form of a 3 × 3 matrix. MD is used for
measuring when believing the opponent will defect, and MC is used for mea-
suring when believing the opponent will cooperate. For example, to obtain
the BPA of defecting, the measurement matrix is defined as
MD =MC =


1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0


Then we can obtain the BPA of defecting in unknown condition using Eq.(19).
m (DU) =M · ψ (t2) (19)
The BPA of defecting in the condition that the opponent is known to defect
can be obtained by Eq.(20).
m (DD) = (|ψDD|2 + |ψUD|2 + |ψCD|2) ·M · ψ (t2) (20)
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Step 5: Calculate entanglement degree
Now, the BPAs of decisions have been obtained. The BPA in known condition
is
m1 = {m1 (DD) , m1 (UD) , m1(CD), m1 (DC) , m1 (UC) , m1(CC)} . (21)
As the participant’s beliefs are certain, no interference effect will be produced.
The BPA of uncertain state is distributed based on classical PPT . The
cardinality of DD, CD, DC and CC is 1. The cardinality of UD and UC is
2 as the actions are uncertain.
The BPA in unknown condition is
m2 = {m2 (DU) , m2 (UU) , m2(CU)} . (22)
It should be noticed that
m2 (DU) = m1 (DD) +m1 (DC)
m2 (UU) = m1 (UD) +m1 (UC)
m2 (CU) = m1 (CD) +m1 (CC)
As the opponent’s decision is totally unknown and entanglement exists be-
tween beliefs and action, the BPA of uncertain state is distributed based on
an entanglement degree. Then the interference effect will be produced. The
cardinality of D and C is 2 as the beliefs are uncertain. The cardinality of
UU is 3 as both the beliefs and actions are uncertain.
Then an entanglement degree is defined in our model using Deng entropy.
Definition 3.1. Let m1 and m2 be two BPAs which illustrate the supporting
of decisions under different frames of discernment. m1 is under the known
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condition and m2 is under the unknown condition. Ed1 and Ed2 are infor-
mation volume of m1 and m2 respectively measured by Deng entropy. The
entanglement degree γ is defined as follows:
γ =
Ed2 −Ed1
Ed2
(23)
Step 6: Obtain probability distribution
As the uncertain state is not an outcome of the game, the BPA of uncertain
state should be distributed into cooperation state and defection state. For
BPA m1,
P1 (D) = m1 (DD) +
1
2
m1 (UD) +m1 (DC) +
1
2
m1 (UC) . (24)
For BPA m2,
P2 (D) = m2 (DU) +
(
1
2
± γ
)
m2 (UU) . (25)
where γ is an entanglement degree, ± corresponds to produce positive inter-
ference effect and negative interference effect respectively.
Obviously, P1 (D) is different from P2 (D). The difference value is the inter-
ference effect Int.
Int = P2 (D)− P1 (D) = ±γ ·m2 (UU) (26)
In sum, based on the above steps, the decision making process is modelled
and the interference effect can be effectively measured.
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4. Categorization decision-making experiment
4.1. Experiment
Townsend etal.[51] proposed a categorization decision-making experiment
to study the interactions between categorization and decision making. In
the experiment, pictures of faces varying along face width and lip thickness
are shown to participants. Generally, the faces can be distributed into two
different kinds: one is a narrow (N) face with a narrow width and thick
lips; the other one is a wide (W) face with a wide width and thin lips (see
Figure 6 for example). The participants are informed that N face had a 0.60
probability to come from the ”bad” guy population while W face had a 0.60
probability to come from the ”good” guy population. The experiment can
Figure 5: Example faces used in a categorization decision-making experiment
be classified into two parts. One part is in categorization-decision making
(C-D) condition: participants are asked to categorize a face as belonging
to either a ”good” (G) guy or ”bad” (B) guy following make a decision
whether to ”attack” (A) or to to ”withdraw” (W). The other part is decision-
making along (D-along) condition: participants are asked to only make an
action decision. The experiment included a total of 26 participants, but each
participant provided 51 observations for the C-D condition for a total of
26× 51 = 1326 observations, while each person produced 17 observations for
the D condition for a total of 17× 26 = 442 total observations.
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The experiment results are shown in Table 1. The column labeled P (G) rep-
Table 1: The results of C-D condition and D-along condition
Type face P (G) P (A|G) P (B) P (A|B) PT P (A)
Wide 0.84 0.35 0.16 0.52 0.37 0.39
Narrow 0.17 0.41 0.83 0.63 0.59 0.69
resents the probability of categorizing the face as a ”good buy”. The column
labeled P (A|G) represents the probability of attacking given categorizing the
face as a ”good guy”. The column labeled P (B) represents the probability
of categorizing the face as a ”bad buy”. The column labeled P (A|B) repre-
sents the probability of attacking given categorizing the face as a ”bad guy”.
And the column labeled PT represents the final probability of attacking in
C-D condition which is computed as follows:
P (A) = P (G) · P (A|G) + P (B) · P (A|B) (27)
Accordingly, the column label as P (A) represents the probability of attacking
in D-along condition. As shown in Table 1, some deviation exist between
PT and P (A) for both types of face which is called the disjunction effect.
However, the disjunction effect is prominent for narrow type faces, while the
disjunction effect is weak for wide type faces.
The classical paradigm has been discussed in many works. Literatures of
studying the categorization decision-making experiment and their results are
shown below in Table 2.
4.2. Application
In the following, our model will be applied to explain the disjunction effect
for narrow type faces.
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Table 2: Results of other categorization decision-making experiments
Literature Type P (G) P (A|G) P (B) P (A|B) PT P (A)
Townsend etal.(2000)[51]
W 0.84 0.35 0.16 0.52 0.37 0.39
N 0.17 0.41 0.83 0.63 0.59 0.69
Busemeyer etal.(2009)[22]
W 0.80 0.37 0.20 0.53 0.40 0.39
N 0.20 0.45 0.80 0.64 0.60 0.69
Wang and Busemeyer(2016)
Experiment 1[14]
W 0.78 0.39 0.22 0.52 0.42 0.42
N 0.21 0.41 0.79 0.58 0.54 0.59
Wang and Busemeyer(2016)
Experiment 2[14]
W 0.78 0.33 0.22 0.53 0.37 0.37
N 0.24 0.37 0.76 0.61 0.55 0.60
Wang and Busemeyer(2016)
Experiment 3[14]
W 0.77 0.34 0.23 0.58 0.40 0.39
N 0.24 0.33 0.76 0.66 0.58 0.62
Average
W 0.79 0.36 0.21 0.54 0.39 0.39
N 0.21 0.39 0.79 0.62 0.57 0.64
1 In Busemeyer etal.(2009)[22], the classical experiment is replicated.
2 In Wang and Busemeyer(2016)[14], Experiment 1 uses a larger data set to replicate
the classical experiment. Experiment 2 introduce a new X-D trial verse C-D trial and
only the result of C-D trial is used here. In experiment 3, the reward for attacking
bad people is a bit less than the other two.
Step 1: Determine the frame of discrimination
In C-D condition, the outcome will be either to A or W given categorizing
the face as G or B. Thus the basic states ”AG”,”WG”,”AB” and ”WB”
consist the frame of discernment, where, for example, ”AG” represents the
participant decide to attack when categorizing the face as a good guy. Then
extra state ”AWG”, ”AWB” and ∅ will be included to fill the power set of this
discrimination. State ”AWG” represents that the participant is uncertain to
attack or withdraw given categorizing the face as a good guy and it can be
denoted as ”UG”. Same as it, state ”AWB” can be denoted as ”UB”. And
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the empty set ∅ is irrespective in the model as it is meaningless.
In D-along condition, the outcome of the game will be either to A or W
without categorizing the face. Thus the basic states ”AU” and ”WU” consist
the frame of discrimination. Then extra state ”AWU” and ∅ will be included
to fill the power set of this discrimination. State ”AWU” presents that the
participant is uncertain to attack or withdraw without categorization and it
can be denoted as ”UU”. And the empty set ∅ is irrespective in the model
as it is meaningless.
Step 2: Representation of beliefs and actions
The initial state involves six combination of beliefs and actions
{|BGAA〉 , |BGAU〉 , |BGAW 〉 , |BBAA〉 , |BBAU 〉 , |BCAW 〉}
. Participants’ state is a superposition of the six basis states
|ψ〉 = ψDD · |BDAD〉+ ψUD · |BDAU〉+ ψCD · |BDAC〉+ ψDC · |BCAD〉
+ ψUC · |BCAU〉+ ψCC · |BCAD〉
(28)
and the initial state corresponds to an amplitude distribution represented by
the 6× 1 column matrix
ψ (0)=


ψAG
ψUG
ψWG
ψAB
ψUB
ψWB


.
Step 3: Inferences based on prior information
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In C-D condition, if the participant categorizes the face as ”good”, the state
changes to
ψ (t1) =
1√
|ψAG|2 + |ψUG|2 + |ψWG|2


ψAG
ψUG
ψWG
0
0
0


=
[
ψG
0
]
. (29)
If the participant categorizes the face as ”bad”, the state changes to
ψ (t1) =
1√
|ψAB|2 + |ψUB|2 + |ψWB|2


0
0
0
ψAB
ψUB
ψWB


=
[
0
ψB
]
. (30)
In D-along condition, the state is a superposition formed by a weighted sum
of the amplitude distribution for two known conditions in C-D condition.
ψ (t1) =
√
|ψAG|2 + |ψUG|2 + |ψWG|2
[
ψG
0
]
+
√
|ψAB|2 + |ψUB|2 + |ψWB|2
[
0
ψB
]
.
(31)
Step 4: Obtain BPA based on payoffs
The evolution of the state obeys a Schro¨dinger equation (Eq. (1)). The
solution is
ψ (t2) = e
−iHt · ψ (t1)
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In this problem, t is set to pi
2
as Busemeyer etal.[22]. The Hamiltonian matrix
H is
H =
[
HG 0
0 HB
]
(32)
with
HG =


hG 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 −hG

 and HB =


hB 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 −hB


In C-D condition, if the face is categorized as ”good”, the state changes to
ψ (t2) = e
−i·H·t · ψ(t1)=
[
e−i·HG·t 0
0 e−i·HB·t
]
·
[
ψG
0
]
= e−i·HG·t · ψG (33)
If the face is categorized as ”bad”, the state changes to
ψ (t2) = e
−i·H·t · ψ(t1)=
[
e−i·HG·t 0
0 e−i·HB·t
]
·
[
0
ψB
]
= e−i·HB ·t · ψB (34)
In D-along condition, the state changes to
ψ (t2) = e
−i·H·t · ψ(0)=
[
e−i·HG·t 0
0 e−i·HB ·t
]
·


√
|ψAG|2 + |ψUG|2 + |ψWG|2 · ψG√
|ψAB|2 + |ψUB |2 + |ψWB|2 · ψB


=
√
|ψAG|2 + |ψUG|2 + |ψWG|2·e−i·HG·t · ψG+√
|ψAB|2 + |ψUB |2 + |ψWB|2 · e−i·HB ·t · ψB
(35)
The measure matrix is
M =
(
M1 0
0 M2
)
where M1 and M2 is set as
M1 =M2 =


1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0

 ,


0 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 0

 or


0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 1


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respectively to pick out the state of attacking, uncertainty or defecting.
In C-D condition, the BPA of states ”AG”, ”UG” and ”WG” can be obtained
by Eq. (36).
m = P (G) · ∥∥M · e−itH · ψ (t1)∥∥2 (36)
where P (G) is the probability that a face is categorized as ”G”, equalling to√
|ψAG|2 + |ψUG|2 + |ψWG|2.
The BPA of states ”AB”, ”UB” and ”WB” can be obtained by Eq. (37).
m = P (B) · ∥∥M · e−itH · ψ (t1)∥∥2 (37)
where P (B) is the probability that a face is categorized as ”B”, equalling to√
|ψAB|2 + |ψUB|2 + |ψWB|2.
Thus the BPA in C-D condition is
m1 = (m (AG) , m (UG) , m (WG) , m (AB) , m (UB) , m (WG))
= (0.0414, 0.0567, 0.0720, 0.3846, 0.2767, 0.1688) .
In D-along condition, the BPA of states ”AU”, ”UU” and ”WU” can be
obtained by Eq. (38).
m =
∥∥M · e−itH · ψ (t1)∥∥2 (38)
Thus the BPA in D-along condition is
m2 = (m (AU) , m (UU) , m (WU)) = (0.4259, 0.3333, 0.2407) .
There are four free parameters existing in our model shown as Table 3. hG
and hB are reward functions set by users. P (G) and P (B) are obtained from
the experiment result.
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Table 3: The value of free parameters
Parameters hG hB P (G) P (B)
Value -0.1376 0.2033 0.83 0.17
Step 5: Calculate entanglement degree
The information volume of m1 and m2 is measured as following:
Ed1 = −0.0414log2
(
0.0414
21−1
)− 0.0567log2 (0.056722−1 )− 0.072log2 (0.07221−1)
−0.3846log2
(
0.3846
21−1
)− 0.2767log2 (0.276722−1 )− 0.1688log2 (0.168821−1 )
= 2.7026
(39)
Ed2 = −0.4259log2
(
0.4259
22−1
)− 0.3333log2 (0.333323−1 )− 0.2407log2 (0.240722−1 )
= 3.5398
(40)
Then then entanglement degree γ is calculated as
γ =
Ed2 − Ed1
Ed2
= 0.2365. (41)
Step 6: Obtain probability distribution
In C-D condition, the probability of attack P1 is
P1 (A) = m1 (AG) +
1
2
m1 (UG) +m1 (AB) +
1
2
m1 (UB) = 0.5927
which is exactly the same as the experiment result.
In D-along condition, as a positive interference effect is produced, the prob-
ability of attack P2 is
P2 (A) = m2(AU) +
(
1
2
+ γ
)
m2 (UU) = 0.6715
which is close to the experiment result.
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The interference effect produced by categorization is measured as
Int = P2 (A)− P1 (A) = γ ·m2 (UU) = 0.0788
4.3. Comparison
Compare the obtained model results with the observed experiment results
(for N type face), the model results are close to the practical situation, which
verifies the correctness and effectiveness of our model. As Table 4 shows, the
interference effect is predicted and the average error rate is less than 1%.
The decision making process is modelled and the disjunction effect is well
explained in our model.
Table 4: The result of QDB model
Literature P (G) P (A|G)1 P (B) P (A|B)2 PT P (A)
Townsend
etal.(2000)
Obs 0.17 0.41 0.83 0.63 0.59 0.69
QDB 0.17 0.4100 0.83 0.6301 0.5926 0.6715
Busemeyer
etal.(2009)
Obs 0.20 0.45 0.80 0.64 0.60 0.69
QDB 0.20 0.4470 0.80 0.6340 0.5965 0.6689
Wang and Busemeyer(2016)
Experiment 1
Obs 0.21 0.41 0.79 0.58 0.54 0.59
QDB 0.21 0.4148 0.79 0.5916 0.5544 0.6241
Wang and Busemeyer(2016)
Experiment 2
Obs 0.24 0.37 0.76 0.61 0.55 0.60
QDB 0.24 0.3720 0.76 0.6162 0.5575 0.6247
Wang and Busemeyer(2016)
Experiment 3
Obs 0.24 0.33 0.76 0.66 0.58 0.62
QDB 0.24 0.3381 0.76 0.6454 0.5716 0.6417
Average
Obs 0.21 0.39 0.79 0.62 0.57 0.64
QDB 0.21 0.3964 0.79 0.6235 0.5758 0.6462
1 Obs represents the observed experiment result.
2 QDB represents the results of quantum dynamic belief model.
In the following, the comparison among our quantum dynamic belief model,
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Markov belief-action (BA) model and quantum belief-action entanglement
(BAE) model will be made.
Markov BA model was proposed by Townsend etal.(2000)[51] to do the
category-decision task. The model assumes that the categorization and
decision-making are two parts in the chain, namely the categorization de-
pends only on the face while the action depends only on the categorization.
In C-D condition, the probability of attacking equals to φ(G) · φ(A|G) given
Figure 6: The decision-making process of Markov BA model
the face is categorized as G and equals to φ(B) · φ(A|B) given the face is
categorized as B. In D-along condition, the probability of attacking equals
to the probability of reaching the state A by two different paths.
φ(A) = φ(G) · φ(A|G) + φ(B) · φ(A|B)
Hence, the Markov BA model follows the law of total probability, which
means that disjunction effect cannot be explained.
Quantum BAEmodel was initially proposed by Pothos and Busemeyer (2009)[21]
and it was improved by Wang and Busemeyer (2016)[14]. The model bases
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on quantum dynamic modelling and the crucial factor to produce interfer-
ence effect is that a free entanglement parameter c is defined. The unitary
matrix in Eq. (2) is e−i(H1+H2)t, where H1 is the same as H in our model. H2
rotates inferences for G face to match W action and rotates inferences for B
face to match A action, which produces the interference effect.
H2 =
c√
2


−1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 −1


In order to compare the ability of predict the interference effect, we apply
three models to obtain the probability of attacking in D-along condition.
The comparison among the three models is shown in Fig. 7. Both the
quantum BAE model and our quantum dynamic belief model can predict
the interference effect while the Markov BA model could not. However, the
prediction result of our quantum dynamic belief model is more accurate. It
should be noticed that although an extra uncertain state is introduced in
our model, the number of free parameters decreases on the contrary. The
entanglement degree is measured by an entropy function in our model rather
a free parameter in the quantum BAE model. Based on the above, it is
reasonable to conclude that the QDB model is correct and efficient.
5. Conclusion
To explain the disjunction fallacy, a new quantum dynamic belief decision
making model is proposed in this paper. The model combines Dempster-
Shafer evidence theory with the quantum dynamic model. The uncertainty
of belief is represented by a superposition of certain states. And the uncer-
tainty in actions is represented as an extra uncertain state with D-S theory.
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Figure 7: The comparison of probability of attacking in D-along condition
The entanglement between beliefs and actions can produce the interference
effect when the beliefs are uncertain. The interference effect is measured by
the uncertain state in actions and an entanglement degree defined by Deng
entropy. A classical categorization decision-making experiment is illustrated
and the new model modelling a real human decision-making process can well
explain the disjunction effect. In the end, the comparison with other models
is made, which shows the correctness and effectiveness of our model.
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